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A War Crimes Tribunal for Sri
Lanka? Examining the Options
Under International Law
Nihal Jayasinghe* & Daley J. Birkett†
In light of the growing international demands for
accountability in relation to alleged war crimes committed in Sri
Lanka during its twenty-six-year armed conflict, this article
aims to evaluate the options available to both Sri Lanka and the
international community under the applicable rules of
international law. First, the background to the armed conflict in
Sri Lanka will be investigated, with a particular focus on the
escalation thereof in 2009. This article will then examine the
options available under public international law to address the
increasing calls for accountability. Throughout the analysis,
comparisons will be drawn between the situation in Sri Lanka
and those in which criminal tribunals have been established to
prosecute those responsible for perpetrating alleged international
crimes. By contrasting the options available in relation to the
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situation in Sri Lanka with analogous situations, conclusions
will be drawn as to the most viable options through which the
intensifying demands for accountability might be met under
international law.
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I.

Introduction

At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM)
held in Sri Lanka from November 10 through 17, 2013, leaders aimed
to discuss global and Commonwealth issues and to decide on
collective policies and initiatives thereto.1 However, the undeniable
focus of Western media and human rights groups was set on the war
crimes allegedly committed in Sri Lanka during the final phase of the
armed conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), which resulted in a
conclusive victory for the latter in May 2009.2 Even though—at the
time of this writing—over five years have passed since the end of the
Sri Lankan conflict, the demand for an investigation of alleged war
crimes does not seem to have abated. This article therefore offers an
1.

What
is
CHOGM?,
COMMONWEALTH
SECRETARIAT,
http://secretariat.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/180385/ (last visited
Aug.
12,
2014);
What
is
CHOGM?,
CHOGM
2013,
http://www.chogm2013.lk/index.php/chogm-2013/about-chogm2013/#
(last visited Aug. 12, 2014).

2.

See James Robbins, Sri Lanka Rights Abuse Allegations Divide
Commonwealth,
BBC
NEWS
(Nov.
14,
2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24946590; Tom Iggulden, War
Crimes Allegations Dominate ‘Extraordinary’ CHOGM in Sri Lanka,
ABC (Nov. 17, 2013), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-17/warcrime-allegations-dominate-chogm-in-sri-lanka/5097302;
Sri
Lanka:
World Must Not Abandon Sri Lanka’s Victims After CHOGM,
AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 17, 2013), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/srilanka-world-must-not-abandon-sri-lanka-s-victims-after-chogm-2013-1117; James Ross, Dispatches: Rights Issues Trump All at CHOGM in Sri
Lanka,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH
(Nov.
17,
2013),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/17/dispatches-rights-issues-trumpall-chogm-sri-lanka.
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assessment of the options available to both Sri Lanka and the wider
international community under international law in order to address
the growing demands that those responsible for the perpetration of
alleged war crimes be held to account.3 First, a brief background to
the armed conflict in Sri Lanka will be provided, followed by an
examination of the attempts already made by the GoSL, the U.N.,
and non-governmental organizations to meet these intensifying
demands.
The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka is a sovereign
island state situated in the Indian Ocean, having gained its
independence from the United Kingdom in 1948. Sri Lanka is an
ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse nation with a
population of 20.3 million people.4 Of this population, almost 75
percent are ethnically Sinhalese, speak Sinhala, and 70 percent
practice Buddhism.5 There is, moreover, a substantial Tamil minority,
and the Tamil language is consequently spoken widely throughout Sri
Lanka. Sri Lanka is an independent nation, with an elected legislature
and executive.6 Indeed, the 2011 Report by the U.N. SecretaryGeneral’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka
(“Accountability Report”) notes that: “Strong indicators of
democracy, including universal franchise, a multi-party system and a
vibrant electoral process, combined with important human
development achievements, such as high literacy rates both for men
and women and low infant mortality, contrast sharply with Sri
Lanka’s long history of war.”7 It is generally agreed that the conflict
in Sri Lanka grew out of increasingly violent ethnic tensions, and that
1983 was the starting point of the armed conflict when the GoSL
responded with armed force in response to LTTE attacks in the
northern district of Jaffna.8

3.

It is emphasized at the outset that the authors neither wish nor intend
to make any judgment on the occurrence or otherwise of the war crimes,
which are alleged to have taken place during the Sri Lankan conflict;
rather, the article aims to present a systematic legal assessment of the
options available in order to investigate the former.

4.

Country
Overview,
GOV’T
OF
SRI
LANKA,
http://www.gov.lk/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=197&Itemid=373&lang=en (last visited Aug. 12, 2014).

5.

Id.

6.

See id.

7.

U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General’s Panel of
Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, ¶ 26 (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pd
f [hereinafter Accountability Report].

8.

See id. ¶ 30.
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After 1983, the LTTE became increasingly militarized and—in
addition to silencing other Tamil groups through violence, thereby
becoming the self-styled sole representative of the Tamil people—
carried out large-scale suicide attacks against political, economic,
military, civilian, and religious targets.9 The tactics adopted by the
LTTE led to its inclusion on the lists of proscribed terrorist
organizations in the U.S., the United Kingdom, India, Canada, and
the European Union.10 The LTTE, moreover, exercised control over
parts of northern and eastern Sri Lanka—sustained by the funding,
advocacy, and support from its large, uncritical diaspora.11 After the
collapse of the Ceasefire Agreement signed by both the GoSL and the
LTTE in 2002,12 and supported by sectors of the international
community as part of the “global war on terror,” the GoSL resumed
full-scale hostilities in 2006, leading to its victory over the LTTE in
the Eastern Province and in some parts of the Northern Province.13 In
September 2008, the GoSL launched its final military offensive against
the remaining LTTE forces in the Northern Province, which resulted
in a decisive victory for the GoSL over the LTTE in May 2009.

II. Some Attempts Made Thus Far to Meet the
Demands for Accountability
On June 22, 2010, the U.N. Secretary-General appointed the
Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka (“Panel of Experts”)
in order “to advise [it] on the issue of accountability with regard to
alleged violations of international humanitarian and human rights law
during final stages of armed conflict in Sri Lanka.”14 The Executive
Summary of the Accountability Report further provides, in relevant
part, as follows:
On 22 June 2010, the Secretary-General announced the
appointment of a Panel of Experts to advise him on the
implementation of the joint commitment included in the
statement issued by the President of Sri Lanka and the
Secretary-General at the conclusion of the Secretary-General’s
visit to Sri Lanka on 23 March 2009. In the Joint Statement,
the Secretary-General “underlined the importance of an
9.

See id. ¶¶ 31–32.

10.

See id. ¶ 32.

11.

See id. ¶ 33–34.

12.

The full text of which is available at Full text of the Ceasefire
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
21,
2002),
Agreement,
THE
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/22/srilanka.

13.

See Accountability Report, supra note 7, ¶¶ 45–46.

14.

Id. ¶ 5.
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accountability process”, and the [GoSL] agreed that it “will take
measures to address those grievances”. The Panel’s mandate is
to advise the Secretary-General regarding the modalities,
applicable international standards and comparative experience
relevant to an accountability process, having regard to the
nature and scope of alleged violations of international
humanitarian and human rights law during the final stages of
the armed conflict in Sri Lanka.15

In light of the allegations found credible thereby, the Panel of Experts
recommended, inter alia, that the GoSL, “in compliance with its
international obligations and with a view to initiating an effective
domestic accountability process, should immediately commence
genuine investigations into . . . [the] alleged violations of international
humanitarian and human rights law committed by both sides
involved in the armed conflict.”16 The Panel of Experts further
recommended that:
The Secretary-General should immediately proceed to establish
an independent international mechanism, whose mandate should
include the following concurrent functions: (i) Monitor and
assess the extent to which the [GoSL] is carrying out an
effective domestic accountability process, including genuine
investigations of the alleged violations, and periodically advise
the Secretary-General on its findings; [and] (ii) Conduct
investigations independently into the alleged violations, having
regard to genuine and effective domestic investigations . . .17

Prior to the Accountability Report, the GoSL appointed a
Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation (LLRC),
which was mandated “to look back at the conflict Sri Lanka suffered
as well as to look ahead for an era of healing and peace building in
the country.”18 The LLRC was more specifically instructed as follows:
[T]o inquire and report on the following matters that may have
taken place during the period between 21st February 2002 and
19th May 2009, namely;

15.

Id. at i.

16.

Id. at vii.

17.

Id.

18.

Comm’n of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt & Reconciliation, Report of
the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation 1
(2011),
available
at
http://www.llrcaction.gov.lk/Downloads/FINALLLRCREPORT.pdf.
The LLRC was founded under Sri Lankan law, namely Section 2 of the
Commissions of Inquiry Act (Chapter 393). Id.
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(i)

the facts and circumstances which led to the failure of the
ceasefire agreement operationalized on 21st February 2002
and the sequence of events that followed thereafter up to
the 19th of May 2009;

(ii) whether any person, group or institution directly or
indirectly bear responsibility in this regard;
(iii) the lessons we would learn from those events and their
attendant concerns, in order to ensure that there will be no
recurrence;
(iv) the methodology whereby restitution to pay persons
affected by those events or their dependants [sic] or their
heirs, can be effected;
(v) the institutional, administrative and legislative measures
which need to be taken in order to prevent any recurrence
of such concerns in the future, and to promote further
national unity and reconciliation among all communities
and; to make any such other recommendations with
reference to any of the matters that have been inquired
into under the terms of the Warrant.19

Following its inquiries, the LLRC made a number of recommendations
in order to promote reconciliation including the establishment of an
independent institution to address the grievances of Sri Lankan
citizens affected by state action, the devolution of power by the
GoSL, better implementation of the state-led language policy, the
pressing need to standardize access to education, the promotion of
interfaith activities, linguistic and cultural affinities, and people-topeople contact, better engagement with the diaspora, and the need to
establish political consensus among the major political parties and
between Sinhala and Tamil communities.20
On March 22, 2012, the U.N. Human Rights Council adopted a
resolution—the draft of which was first proposed by the
U.S.21—regarding the promotion of reconciliation and accountability
in Sri Lanka.22 The text of this resolution provides, in relevant part,
as follows:
19.

Id. at iii–iv.

20.

See id. at 375–88.

21.

Human Rights Council Draft Res. 19/…, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/L.2
(Mar. 8, 2012).

22.

Human Rights Council Res. 19/2, Rep. of the Human Rights Council,
A/HRC/19/2 (Mar. 22, 2012). See also UN Adopts Resolution on Sri
Lanka
War
Crimes
Probe,
BBC
(Mar.
22,
2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17471300.
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The Human Rights Council . . .
1.

Calls upon the [GoSL] to implement the constructive
recommendations made in the [LLRC report] and to take
all necessary additional steps to fulfil its relevant legal
obligations and commitment to initiate credible and
independent
actions
to
ensure
justice,
equity,
accountability and reconciliation for all Sri Lankans;

2.

Requests the [GoSL] to present, as expeditiously as
possible, a comprehensive action plan detailing the steps
that the Government has taken and will take to implement
the recommendations made in the [LLRC report], and also
to address alleged violations of international law;

3.

Encourages the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights and relevant special
procedures mandate holders to provide, in consultation
with and with the concurrence of the [GoSL], advice and
technical assistance on implementing the above-mentioned
steps; and requests the Office of the High Commissioner to
present a report on the provision of such assistance to the
Human Rights Council at its twenty-second session.23

Further, the resolution—although welcoming the recommendations
made thereby—criticizes the LLRC for failing to “adequately address
serious allegations of violations of international law.”24 The GoSL was
the subject of further criticism from the British Government, through
the Minister with responsibility for Sri Lanka, Alistair Burt, who also
criticized certain aspects of the LLRC report and called for the GoSL
to implement its recommendations as soon as practicable.25 These
reactions clearly demonstrate that the international community
remains significantly doubtful of GoSL’s commitment to satisfactorily
probe the foregoing violations of international humanitarian law.
Non-governmental organizations have similarly sought to meet
the international demands for accountability. For example, between
January 14 and 16, 2010, the “People’s Tribunal on
Sri Lanka”—organized by the Irish Forum for Peace in Sri Lanka and
conducted by the Permanent People’s Tribunal (PPT) under the
auspices of the Fondazione Leile Basso Sezione Internazionale—sat in
23.

H.R.C. Res. 19/2, supra note 22.

24.

Id.

25.

Foreign Office Minister Responds to Report on the Conflict in Sri
Lanka, FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (Jan. 12, 2012),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-minister-respondsto-report-on-the-conflict-in-sri-lanka (noting that the British government
felt the report left many “gaps and unanswered questions”).
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the Republic of Ireland.26 PPT is self-styled as “an international
opinion tribunal, independent from any State authority . . . [which]
examines cases regarding violations of human rights and the rights of
peoples.”27 As to this session on Sri Lanka, it is explained that:
[T]he PPT was first approached by representatives of a broad
spectrum of NGOs, as early as July 2009. . . . The documents
supporting the request to convene a session of the PPT with the
primary objective of focusing on “the last phase of the war, the
period after the collapse of the peace process, and especially the
last months” were received and accepted on November 19,
2009.28

In light of its examination of the accounts presented thereto, the PPT
recommended, inter alia, that the GoSL “[e]stablish as a matter of
urgency an independent and authoritative Truth and Justice
Commission, to investigate crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed by parties to the conflict in the course of the last phases of
the war after the collapse of the 2002 ceasefire, and ensure the
prosecution of those responsible for war crimes and crimes against
humanity.”29 Indeed, the PPT held a second session on Sri Lanka in
Bremen, Germany from December 7 to the 10, 2013, following which
it made additional recommendations to the U.N., the European
Union, Germany, Sri Lanka, and international organizations and
agencies.30

26.

See PERMANENT PEOPLE’S TRIBUNAL, PEOPLE’S TRIBUNAL ON SRI
LANKA, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland 7 (Jan. 14-16, 2010) available at
http://warwithoutwitness.com/images/stories/news/25851626-people-stribunal-on-srilanka-final-report-jan-2010.pdf.

27.

Id. This description, under the heading, “1. The Competence of the
Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal,” continues, in relevant part, as follows:
“The importance and strength of decisions by the PPT rest on the
moral weight of the causes and arguments to which they give credibility,
as well as the integrity and capability to judge of the Tribunal
members. Complaints heard by the Tribunal are submitted by the
victims, or by groups or individuals representing them. The PPT calls
together all parties concerned and offers the defendants the possibility
to make their own arguments heard. The Jury is selected for each case
by combining members who belong to a permanent list of jurors, and
individuals who are recognized for their competence and integrity.” Id.
The PPT is not vested with legal authority.

28.

Id.

29.

Id. at 20.

30.

See PERMANENT PEOPLES’ TRIBUNAL, PEOPLES’ TRIBUNAL ON SRI LANKA,
Bremen,
Germany
(Dec.
7-10,
2013),
available
at
http://www.internazionaleleliobasso.it/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/Sentenza-Sri-Lanka-and-Tamil-II.pdf.

574

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2014
A War Crimes Tribunal for Sri Lanka?

In view of this renewed attention and criticism, it is apposite to
further discuss the options available under public international law.
This article will therefore now begin to examine the ways in which the
growing demands for accountability might be met under the
applicable rules thereof—including through the International Criminal
Court (ICC), by unilateral action on the part of the U.N. Security
Council or General Assembly, by mutual agreement between the U.N.
and the GoSL, and by independent action on the part of the latter.
Throughout this legal assessment, the options will be compared with
similar cases in which tribunals were founded to investigate and try
those responsible for the commission of alleged international crimes.

III. Options Under International Law
A.

Action by the International Criminal Court

Sri Lanka is not currently—and has never been—a state party to
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome
Statute”),31 Article 12(2) of which provides as follows:
[T]he Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the
following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a)

The State on the territory of which the conduct in
question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board
a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel
or aircraft;

(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a
national.32

In the instant case, the crimes in question were allegedly
committed on the territory of Sri Lanka by Sri Lankan nationals. In
light thereof, and given Sri Lanka’s status as a non-signatory to the
Rome Statute, the ICC has—prima facie—no jurisdiction over the
crimes allegedly committed in the Sri Lankan conflict. As argued by
Professor Madeline Morris:
[There exists a] gap in jurisdiction. If a crime is committed by a
non-party national on that non-party’s territory, then the ICC
may not exercise jurisdiction. So, even if the ICC had existed at
the relevant time, it would not, for example, have been able to
31.

See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties
%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Aug. 12, 2014).

32.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12(2), opened for
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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exercise jurisdiciton [sic] over the crimes of Pol Pot in
Cambodia or Kambanda in Rwanda if Cambodia or Rwanda,
respectively, were non-parties to the [Rome Statute]. In this
way, the ICC’s effectiveness as an enforcement mechanism is
significantly limited.33

To this end, it is argued that the crimes allegedly committed in Sri
Lanka fall through the same “gap in jurisdiction.” However, the
possibility remains that the jurisdiction of the ICC could be triggered
by a resolution of the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter.34 To this end, Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute
provides as follows:
The ICC may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime
referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this
Statute if:
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to
have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter
of the United Nations.35

The Security Council has utilized this power on only two occasions
since the Rome Statute came into force: in the situation in Darfur,
Sudan;36 and in the situation in Libya.37 Consequently, the ICC

33.

Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and NonParty States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 14 n.3 (2001). See also
Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction over Non-Signatory
Nationals, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 1–2 (2000); Dapo Akande, The
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of NonParties: Legal Basis and Limits, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 618, 618–19
(2003); Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction over the Nationals of
Non-Party States: A Critique of the US Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 67, 69 (2001).

34.

U.N. Charter, ch. VII. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 168–69 (4th ed.
2011) (describing the process of Security Council referrals to the ICC);
Luigi Condorelli & Santiago Villalpando, Referral and Deferral by the
Security Council, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 627–54 (Antonio Cassese, Paola
Gaeta, & John R. W. D. Jones eds., 2002); Sharon Williams & William
Schabas, Article 12, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY
ARTICLE 569–74 (2d ed. 2008).

35.

Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 13(b).

36.

See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). Sudan—like
Sri Lanka—is not a state party to the Rome Statute. This referral led to
the issuance of five warrants of arrest, including that of President Omar
al-Bashir. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No.
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may—albeit in limited circumstances—exercise jurisdiction over
crimes committed on the territory of non-states parties to the Rome
Statute and by nationals of non-signatory states.38 However, the
Security Council failed to reach consensus as to binding measures at
the time the Sri Lankan conflict escalated.39 Indeed, the only action
taken by the Security Council at that stage was the release of a press
statement,40 the text of which expressed, inter alia, grave concern at
the worsening humanitarian situation in Sri Lanka, acknowledged the
genuine right of the GoSL to combat terrorism, and demanded that
all parties adhere to their obligations under international
humanitarian law.41 Because one or more of the five permanent
members of the Security council opposed such binding measures,42 the
Chapter VII option to create ICC jurisdiction was not activated.
ICC-02/05-01/09, Request for Arrest and Surrender (July 7, 2014),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1800331.pdf.
37.

See S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). This
referral led to the issuance of three arrest warrants. See Press Release,
Security Council, Chief Prosecutor of International Criminal Court Tells
Security Council He Will Seek Arrest Warrants Soon Against Three
Individuals in First Libya Case, U.N. Press Release SC/10241 (May 4,
2011). Libya—like Sudan and Sri Lanka—is not a state party to the
Rome Statute.

38.

See, e.g., Morris, supra note 33, at 14 n.3.

39.

It has been argued that Russo-Chinese opposition to any action against
the GoSL security forces in Sri Lanka has prevented consensus in the
Security Council. See, e.g., Russia China ‘Support Sri Lanka,’ BBC
SINHALA
(June
18,
2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2011/06/110618_lanka_chin
a_russia.shtml. If this view is accepted, it is not illogical to suggest that
a binding measure by the Security Council on the Sri Lankan issue
seems unlikely.

40.

Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Sri
Lanka, U.N. Press Release SC/9659 (May 13, 2009).

41.

Id.

42.

Indeed, China has publicly expressed support for the way in which the
GoSL has acted in response to the growing demands for accountability
in relation to alleged war crimes: “Sri Lanka has set up relevant
institution to look into civil war-related issues. China believes that the
[GoSL] and [the] people of Sri Lanka are capable of handling all relevant
issues. We hope the international community can support and
coordinate the endeavor of the [GoSL], create a favorable external
environment for the [GoSL]’s efforts to stabilize domestic situation and
accelerate economic development, and refrain from taking any measure
to complicate the issue.” Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s
Remarks on the Report of the UN Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts
on Sri Lanka, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC
OF
CHINA,
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t819905.htm.
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Consequently, because Sri Lanka is also not a state party to the
Rome Statute, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over the crimes
allegedly committed by Sri Lankan nationals during the armed
conflict.
Notwithstanding, it is noted that the GoSL may elect to lodge a
declaration with the Registrar under Article 12(3) of the Rome
Statute, accepting jurisdiction of the ICC on an ad hoc basis over a
particular situation or certain crimes. Pursuant to Article 12(3), if a
non-state party accepts the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC by making
such a declaration, the foregoing jurisdictional gap is filled; in other
words, this gap is only relevant as regards non-states parties that are
unwilling to make such a declaration.43 Although it appears unlikely
that the GoSL will shortly lodge a declaration, it is nonetheless
noteworthy that there exists a statutory mechanism for non-states
parties to consent to the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC, which has
been utilized to date by Côte d’Ivoire,44 the Palestinian National
Authority,45 and Ukraine.46
B.

Action by the U.N.: An Ad Hoc Tribunal for Sri Lanka?

The Security Council is, however, further empowered to act under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, Article 39 of which provides as
follows:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
43.

Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute provides as follows: “If the acceptance
of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under
paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar,
accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime
in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without
any delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.” See also Prosecutor
v. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11 OA 2,
Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo Against the
Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I on Jurisdiction and Stay of the
Proceedings,
¶¶
72–84
(Dec.
12,
2012),
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1526463.pdf (noting the example of Côte
d’Ivoire, which is not a party to the Rome Statute, but was nonetheless
subject to ICC jurisdiction pursuant to an Article 12(3) declaration).

44.

See Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11 OA 2, ¶ 75.

45.

See Victor Kattan, Palestine and the International Criminal Court,
EURO. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 1, 2014),
http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_palestine_and_the_in
ternational_criminal_court303.

46.

Ukraine Accepts ICC Jurisdiction over Alleged Crimes Committed
Between 21 November 2013 and 22 February 2014, Int’l Crim. Ct. (Apr.
17,
2014),
http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/pages/p
r997.aspx.
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make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken
in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security.

It was pursuant to this legal basis that the Security Council
established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia—in Resolution 827 (1993)47—and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda—in Resolution 955 (1994).48 However,
it must be noted that the formation of these two ad hoc criminal
tribunals was only possible owing to the non-opposition of all five
permanent members of the Security Council. Accordingly, without
consensus, the U.N. Security Council is unable to pass a binding
measure regarding the crimes allegedly committed during the armed
conflict in Sri Lanka. It is consequently suggested that a more viable
alternative might be a mechanism established by an international
agreement between the U.N. and the GoSL, similar to that which
occurred in Cambodia.
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)
was established jointly by the 2001 Law on the Establishment of
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea, as amended in 2004,49 and the 2004 Agreement Between
the U.N. and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the
Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the
Period of Democratic Kampuchea.50 The ECCC resulted from a tenyear negotiation process between the Royal Government of Cambodia
and the U.N. and is sui generis insofar as, inter alia, it forms a
separate court structure, but is still housed within the Cambodian
legal system, staffed by both Cambodian and international judges,
lawyers, and other personnel.51 The ECCC is able to exercise subject-

47.

See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).

48.

See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).

49.

Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period
of
Democratic
Kampuchea,
amended
Oct.
27,
2004
(NS/RKM/1004/006),
available
at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legaldocuments/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf.

50.

See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government
of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, June
6,
2003,
2329
U.N.T.S.
1,
available
at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legaldocuments/Agreement_between_UN_and_RGC.pdf.

51.

For a comprehensive overview of the history and structure of the
ECCC, see David Scheffer, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
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matter jurisdiction over violations of international conventions as
specified in its constitutive instruments, as well as certain crimes
under the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code. In this way, the ECCC may
be viewed as a domestic court supported by international staff.
It is clear from the Cambodian experience that the U.N. General
Assembly—in addition to the Security Council—is able to play a role
in the establishment of an accountability mechanism, such as a
criminal tribunal.52 However, the legally binding effect of U.N. General
Assembly resolutions is disputed.53 Indeed, pursuant to the doctrine
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, it can be argued that, because
Article 25 of the U.N. Charter expressly provides that member states
are obligated to carry out Security Council resolutions, the absence of
an equivalent power attributed to General Assembly resolutions
renders the latter not legally binding. Thus, General Assembly
resolutions a fortiori contain no legal obligation for member states,
unlike those of the Security Council. An analysis of the U.N. Charter
and the travaux préparatoires thereof demonstrate further that such a
competence is ascribed to the Security Council, but not to the
General Assembly.54 Accordingly, if it is correct that as “a general rule
of modern international institutional law, it has been accepted that
international organizations cannot take binding external decisions
unless their constitutions expressly so provide,”55 the General
of Cambodia, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 219–56 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 2008).
52.

See, e.g., G.A. Res. 57/228, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/228 (Dec. 18,
2002), in which the General Assembly requested, inter alia, the
Secretary-General to resume negotiations to conclude an agreement with
the Government of Cambodia and made recommendations as regards
the subject-matter and personal jurisdiction of the ECCC.

53.

For the ‘moral’ and ‘political’ effects of General Assembly Resolutions,
see, for example, D. H. N. Johnson, The Effect of Resolutions of the
General Assembly of the United Nations, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 97
(1956). See also HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 770, 935 (5th ed. 2011); F. Blaine
Sloan, The Binding Force of a ‘Recommendation’ of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 29 (1948);
Richard A. Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General
Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 783 (1966).

54.

See Falk, supra note 51, at 783 (stating that for example, at the United
Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, the
delegation of the Philippines proposed that “The General Assembly
should be vested with the legislative authority to enact rules of
international law which should become effective and binding upon the
members of the Organization after such rules have been approved by a
majority vote of the Security Council;” however, this proposal was
rejected by twenty-six votes to one).

55.

See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 51, at 825.
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Assembly is able to initiate an accountability mechanism in the
instant case only with the agreement of the GoSL. However, on the
other hand, if the mechanism were to be triggered by the Security
Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, Sri Lanka—as
a member state thereof—is obliged to accept and carry out the
decision under Article 25 of the Charter.56
Indeed, it was under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter that the
Security Council established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
(STL).57 The establishment of the STL is particularly illustrative in
demonstrating that, if an accountability process is initiated by a state
requesting assistance from the U.N., it might be concluded without
the necessary constitutional measures having been fulfilled in the state
concerned. The foundation of the STL stems from, inter alia, a
request by the Government of Lebanon that the U.N. create a
criminal tribunal of international character to try those responsible
for terrorist bombings as well as other attacks in Lebanon since
October 2004.58 An agreement to establish such a tribunal was drafted
but never ratified by the Lebanese Parliament.59 The Security Council
consequently made use of its powers under Chapter VII, thereby
creating the STL, despite the ultimate failure by the state to sign the
constitutive instrument thereof.60 In the instant case, however, in
order to establish a similar tribunal for Sri Lanka, it would require
that either (i) the GoSL consent to the creation thereof or (ii) the
Security Council reach consensus as to binding measures thereto.
Due to the limitations of the foregoing international options and
the Security Council’s inability to reach a consensus regarding a
tribunal for Sri Lanka, the GoSL may consider adopting a similar
approach to the one Bangladesh took in response to the alleged crimes
committed during its Liberation War. Bangladesh equally suffered as
a result of alleged international crimes, but decided to create a
tribunal that was arguably more aligned with the principle of national
sovereignty. The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) is a
Bangladeshi domestic court with no direct involvement of the U.N. or
any other state. The ICT is described as “a war crimes tribunal in
56.

See U.N. Charter art. 25.

57.

See S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007).

58.

the STL, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, http://www.stltsl.org/en/about-the-stl/creation-of-the-stl (last modified Dec. 24, 2012);
Frédéric Mégret, A Special Tribunal for Lebanon: The UN Security
Council and the Emancipation of International Criminal Justice, 21
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 485 (2008).

59.

See Creation of the STL, supra note 56; see also Mégret, supra note 56,
at 492.

60.

See Creation of the STL, supra note 56; see also Mégret, supra note 56,
at 492.
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Bangladesh set up in 2009 to investigate and prosecute suspects for
the atrocities committed in 1971 . . . during the Bangladesh
Liberation War.”61 In addition to the narrow options available under
public international law, internationalized tribunals have faced
growing criticism. Indeed, according to Ambassador Stephen Rapp,
“we are at the end of the era of ad hoc international tribunals.”62 It is
thus arguably more appropriate in the present circumstances to adopt
a similar domestic approach in Sri Lanka.
C.

The Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes

Although the ICC potentially has universal jurisdiction, this
concept may have broader implications for the prosecution of the
alleged war crimes committed during the conflict in Sri Lanka.
Universal jurisdiction is, however, not subject to a universally agreed
definition.63 Nonetheless, the following definition adopted by the
Institute of International Law at its 2005 Session in Krakow is
sufficient for the purposes of the present article:
Universal jurisdiction in criminal matters . . . means the
competence of a State to prosecute alleged offenders and to
punish them if convicted, irrespective of the place of commission
of the crime and regardless of any link of active or passive
nationality, or other grounds of jurisdiction recognized by
international law.64

61.

International Crimes Tribunal (Bangladesh), MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
BANGL.,
http://www.mofa.gov.bd/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=692&Itemid=177 (last visited Aug. 12, 2014).

62.

Stephen J. Rapp, The Reach and the Grasp of International Criminal
Justice—How Do We Lengthen the Arm of the Law?, 45 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 651, 655 (2013).

63.

For example, Dr. Roger O’Keefe adopts the following negative
definition: “universal jurisdiction amounts to the assertion of jurisdiction
to prescribe in the absence of any other accepted jurisdictional nexus at
the time of the relevant conduct.” Roger O’Keefe, Universal
Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 735,
745 (2004) (emphasis added). See generally Georges Abi-Saab, The
Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 596 (2003);
Antonio Cassese, Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a
Sensible Notion of Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 589 (2003);
Olympia Bekou & Robert Cryer, The International Criminal Court and
Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 49
(2007); George P. Fletcher, Against Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 580 (2003); Claus Kreß, Universal Jurisdiction over
International Crimes and the Institut de Droit International, 4 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 561 (2006).

64.

Instit. of Int’l Law, Universal Criminal Jurisdiction with Regard to the
Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, Krakow
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It is, however, widely accepted that universal jurisdiction applies to
certain crimes—including piracy, genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes—because it is argued that every state has a legitimate
interest in the suppression of these serious crimes.65 A notable
example of universal jurisdiction—and specifically relevant to the
instant situation in Sri Lanka—is the number of arrest warrants that
have been issued against Israeli representatives for crimes allegedly
committed in Gaza in response to rocket attacks emanating
therefrom. These warrants were issued without any territorial link,
any link of active or passive nationality, or other grounds of
jurisdiction under the applicable rules of international law. Indeed,
the United Kingdom has made several attempts to exercise universal
jurisdiction against former Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni,66
Major General Doron Almog—the former Head of the Israel Defense
Forces (IDF) Southern Command,67 Defense Minister Ehud Barak,68
and the former IDF Chief of Staff, Moshe Ya’alon.69 Similar such
attempts to exercise this form of jurisdiction have been made in the
Netherlands against former Head of the Shin Bet—Israel’s internal
security service—Ami Ayalon70 and in Spain against former Defense
Sess. Res., 17th Comm’n, ¶ 1 (Aug. 26, 2005), available
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005_kra_03_en.pdf.

at

65.

See, e.g., Julia Geneuss, Fostering a Better Understanding of Universal
Jurisdiction: A Comment on the AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle
of Universal Jurisdiction, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 945, 952 (2009). See
also Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 14
(February 14); O’Keefe, supra note 61, at 757.

66.

See, e.g., Israel Fury at UK Attempt to Arrest Tzipi Livni, BBC (Dec.
15, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8413234.stm.

67.

See, e.g., Israel Fury at UK Attempt to Arrest Tzipi Livni, BBC (Dec.
15, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8413234.stm.

68.

See Ian Black & Ian Cobain, Israeli Minister Ehud Barak Faces War
Crimes Arrest Threat During UK Visit, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 29,
2009),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/29/ehud-barakwar-crimes-israel; Lawyers Seek Arrest of Israeli Defence Minister in
UK for Alleged War Crimes, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2009),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/29/ehud-barak-warrantwar-crimes-gaza.

69.

See, e.g., Israel Minister Feared UK Arrest, BBC (Oct. 5, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8290554.stm.

70.

In this case, an arrest warrant was sought based on allegations of
torture. See Vervolging ex-hoofd Shin Bet, DE TELEGRAAF
(NETHERLANDS)
(Aug.
19,
2009),
http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/article20492744.ece. The court,
however, found that it had no jurisdiction. See Geen vervolging ex-hoofd
Shin Bet, DE TELEGRAAF (NETHERLANDS), (Oct. 27, 2009),
http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/20512624/__geen_vervolging_exhoofd_shin_bet__.html.
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Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer and six other military officers under
his command, including Major General Almog and Moshe Ya’alon.71
Despite these numerous attempts, however, the authors note that the
exercise of universal jurisdiction is not yet governed by an
international agreement and is therefore devoid of a well-structured,
coherent body of law.72 Nonetheless, regardless of this absence, the
possibility that a domestic court outside Sri Lanka might try to
exercise this form of jurisdiction cannot be discounted. Indeed, Sri
Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s visit to the United Kingdom
in 2010 prompted lawyers on behalf of Tamil activists to seek a
warrant for his arrest—under the head of universal jurisdiction—for
the alleged commission of war crimes during the Sri Lankan conflict.73

IV. Concluding Remarks
Thus far, the U.N. Secretary-General has not opted to institute
an independent international accountability mechanism—as
recommended by the Panel of Experts—without the consent of the
GoSL or action by other member states.74 It has also been established
71.

See, e.g., Manuel Altozano, La Audiencia Investigará A Un Ex Ministro
Israelí Por Un Bombardeo En Gaza en 2002, EL PAÍS (Jan. 29, 2009),
http://elpais.com/elpais/2009/01/29/actualidad/1233220623_850215.ht
ml. In this case, the Spanish prosecutor chose not to proceed with the
investigation, having been assured that Israeli jurisdiction prevailed. See
José Yoldi, La Audiencia No Investigará el Ataque de Israel a Gaza, EL
PAÍS
(SPAIN)
(Jun.
30,
2009),
http://elpais.com/elpais/2009/06/30/actualidad/1246349822_850215.ht
ml.

72.

See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 61, at 595 (stating that a treaty
delineating the use and limits of universal jurisdiction would reduce
uncertainties of customary international law, but that creation of such a
treaty would be time-intensive, and thus application of universal
jurisdiction is left to regular construction of customary international
law).

73.

See Owen Bowcott & Sam Jones, War Crimes Lawyers Seek Arrest of
Sri Lankan President in Oxford, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2010),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/sri-lanka-presidentarrest-war-crimes. It is noted that the law in England and Wales has
since changed so that the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions
is required before an arrest warrant is issued in universal jurisdiction
cases brought by individuals. See Press Release: Universal Jurisdiction,
MINISTRY
OF
JUSTICE
(Sept.
15,
2011),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/universal-jurisdiction.

74.

See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General’s
Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka, ¶ 182
(Nov.
2012),
available
at
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review
_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf (“In the absence of both a mandate
and a Government’s consent—as is likely to be the case of Sri Lanka—
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that action by the U.N. Security Council is unlikely in light of the
lack of consensus therein. Moreover, this article establishes that the
General Assembly is similarly unable to act without the consent of
the GoSL. Accordingly, the onus rests on the GoSL to satisfactorily
meet the increasing demands for accountability in relation to the
alleged war crimes committed in Sri Lanka during the conflict
between the LTTE and the former. It is argued that the GoSL ought
not to shy away from the demand for a state-led accountability
mechanism because such an exercise would negate the requirement for
the establishment of an international criminal tribunal, thereby
avoiding the criticisms with which such mechanisms are continually
faced. This course of action would, moreover, reduce the likelihood
that a domestic court outside Sri Lanka would choose to exercise
universal jurisdiction over the alleged war crimes, which would raise
the additional problem of discerning a coherent body of applicable
law. It is the view of the present authors that any domestic inquiry
must be both credible and independent. If not, there is a concrete risk
that it might be considered as an attempt by the current regime to
escape justice and that it might consequently be discarded as such.
It is pleasing to note that the GoSL has launched an action plan
for the implementation of LLRC recommendations.75 Indeed, the
GoSL action plan has consolidated the recommendations under five
headings: International Humanitarian Law Issues; Human Rights;
Land Return and Resettlement; Restitution/Compensatory Relief;
and Reconciliation.76 Under the auspices of the GoSL plan of action,
inter alia, a commission was formed with the mandate to investigate
alleged abductions or disappearances of persons resident in the Sri
Lankan Northern and Eastern Provinces during the period from 1990
to 2009.77 The present authors hope that the GoSL will continue to
the establishment of a Commission of inquiry to conduct investigations
in its territory is virtually impossible. The option of conducting an
investigation outside the territory of Sri Lanka is, of course, possible (as
was the case in a number of occasions in the past), but if it is, it is
likely to replicate the experience of the present [Panel of Experts] with
little added value.”); see also Accountability Report, supra note 7, ¶
444.
75.

See NATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LLRC
RECOMMENDATIONS, http://www.llrcaction.gov.lk/ (last visited Aug. 12,
2014).

76.

Id.

77.

See Presidential Commission to Investigate Alleged Disappearances,
OF
DEF.
SRI
LANKA,
MINISTRY
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Presidential_commission_to_in
vestigate_alleged_disappearances_20140117_05 (last modified Jan. 17,
2014). The present authors note that the Commission held its first
public sittings between January 18 and 21, 2014. See also Rasika
Somarathna, Commission to Investigate into Complaints Regarding
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put into effect the recommendations by the LLRC, which can be
quickly implemented, and that others, which are not yet practicable,
will be realized in due course. It is noted that on February 1, 2014,
the U.S. Department of State— through Assistant Secretary for South
and Central Asia, Nisha Desai Biswal—confirmed that the U.S. is not
entertaining the possibility of economic sanctions against Sri Lanka
“at this point.”78 It is the view of the present authors that if the GoSL
remains indifferent to the views of the international community, Sri
Lanka may face an international investigation without the consent
and participation of the former in addition to such measures. In order
to prevent further instability thereby, it is consequently emphasized
that there is a pressing need for the GoSL to establish an appropriate
accountability mechanism in relation to alleged war crimes committed
during the armed conflict in Sri Lanka.
Although the U.S. cannot be said to speak on behalf of the entire
international community,79 recent statements delivered thereby
suggest that there is growing impatience at the international level
over the pace at which the GoSL is implementing the
recommendations of the LLRC.80 To this end, the U.S. sponsored a
third resolution when the U.N. Human Rights Council reconvened in
March 2014, calling for, inter alia, the establishment of a Sri Lankanled reconciliation and accountability process.81 In light thereof, it is
evident that at least part of the wider international community would
prefer a process initiated by the GoSL; however, should the latter
choose not to take positive action, it is equally clear that further
measures might be considered by third party states in order to put an
accountability mechanism into effect. It is the hope of the present
Missing Persons: Compensation to Next of Kin, DAILY NEWS,
http://www.dailynews.lk/?q=features/compensation-next-kin
(last
visited Aug. 12, 2014) (noting that thus far, the Commission has
received approximately 16,000 complaints).
78.

Press Conference with Assistant Secretary Nisha Biswal in Colombo, Sri
Lanka,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE
(Feb.
1,
2014),
http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2014/221143.htm.

79.

See, e.g., Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Remarks, supra
note 42.

80.

The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron,
emphasized that a state-led investigation must be completed by March
2014, lest his government press for an international process. See
Cameron Calls for War Crimes Inquiry in Sri Lanka, BBC (Nov. 16,
2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24967501.

81.

See Human Rights Council Adopts a Resolution on Reconciliation,
Accountability and Human Rights in Sri Lanka, HUMAN RIGHTS
COUNCIL
(Mar.
27,
2014),
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsI
D=14447&LangID=E.
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authors that this article will stimulate further discussion on the issues
raised herein. It is noted that, in March 2014, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay made public her written
report based on her week-long visit to Sri Lanka in August 2013.82 It
is hoped that this report, alongside the aforementioned meeting of the
U.N. Human Rights Council, will significantly contribute towards the
realization of credible justice, accountability, and a reconciliation
process in Sri Lanka.

82.

U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Promoting Reconciliation and
Accountability in Sri Lanka, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/23 (Feb. 24, 2014).
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